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Delinquency Jurisdiction in a Unified 
Family Court: Balancing Intervention, 
Prevention, and Adjudication 
GLORIA DANZIGER * 
I. Introduction 
[O]ut of the juvenile court and experience of its possibilities there has grown 
awareness of the futility of dealing with the troubles of a household in detached 
fragments after damage has been done. We have been learning better methods 
than to have four separate courts in eight separate and unrelated proceedings 
trying unsystematically and not infrequently at cross purposes to adjust the 
relations and order the conduct of a family which has ceased to function as such 
and is bringing or threatening to bring up delinquent instead of upright citizens 
contributing to the productive work of the people. 
Dean Roscoe Pound 1 
On July 1, 1889, Jane Addams, together with the Chicago Woman's 
Club2 and the Hull House Community, established in Chicago the first 
* Senior Fellow, Center for Families, Children and the Courts, University of Baltimore 
School of Law; formerly Staff Director, Standing Committee on Substance Abuse, American 
Bar Association. 
I. See Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., The Juvenile Coun at 100 Years: A Look Back, 6(2) Juv. 
JUSTICE (Dec. 1999) (citing Roscoe Pound, Future Challenges Judges, 1(4) THE Juv. COURT 
JUDGES J. 21, 23, 28 (1950). 
2. The two groups of women reformers worked closely together and used many of the same 
arguments. However, although the distinction between the two groups was not always very 
sharp, there were differences in approach. The Club women acted as "true materialists," empha-
sizing their identification as women and mothers, whereas the Hull House women were more 
concerned to use their background in social sciences to inform their reaction to the "child prob-
lem." In many senses the Hull House women had a clearer idea of what lay behind juvenile 
delinquency than did the Club women, and for this reason their emphasis was more on pre-
venting children from ever getting into trouble with the law than on alleviating conditions once 
children had become involved in the justice system. 
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children's court in the world. Their goal was to create a separate and distinct 
venue for children in crisis, one that would prevent their subjection to 
adult courts, adult prisons, and poorhouses. 
The founders strove to develop a safe haven, a space to protect, to rehabil-
itate, and to heal children, a site of nurturance and guidance, understanding 
and compassion. They envisioned the Juvenile Court functioning in the 
best interest of children and youth, acting in any circumstance, they said, 
exactly as a kind and just parent would act.3 
In many ways, that first children's court-and Jane Addams' vision-
was premised on providing a "family" for the delinquents, paupers, immi-
grants, and other "neglected" or "corrupt" children of Chicago. It was a 
"multi-service" settlement house-a place of solidarity and support4-
with the court offering a place where children and families in crisis would 
be nurtured, guided, and supported by a community with the expertise and 
willingness to address a family's or child's needs.5 
In short, the first juvenile court was actually based on a therapeutic 
mode1.6 As some authors point out, the Pre-Gault court was "a kind of 
unified family court.,,7 These courts generally had jurisdiction over delin-
quency, dependency, and neglect cases;8 they were based on addressing the 
family as a unit from an ecological approach and were designed to "protect 
and rehabilitate" youth in generally informal and private proceedings.9 The 
Both the Chicago Woman's Club and the Hull House community were, however, ultimately 
concerned with overcoming the inadequacies of the existing system of treating problem chil-
dren and making sure that the state recognized its duty towards these children. Moreover, both 
were anxious to ensure that all children received the proper love and nurture that they regarded 
as the right of every child. Their campaign to secure legislation to embody these ideas was 
prompted by a recognition that they needed legal sanction for informal practices and a desire 
that the state should take responsibility for protecting family life. See Elizabeth J. Clapp, "The 
Chicago Juvenile Court Movement in the 1890s," paper presented at the Center for Urban 
History, University of Leicester, March 17, 1995. 
3. WILLL'\M AYERS, A KL"ID AND JUST PARE.NT: Th-E CHILDREN OF JUVENILE COURT 24 
(1997). 
4. [d. at 26. 
5. [d. 
6. Elizabeth F. Emens, et aI., Preventing Juvenile Delinquency: An Ecological, 
Developmental Approach, in CHILDREN, FAMILIES AND GOVERNMENT: PREPARING FOR THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 308, 311 (Edward F. Zigler, Sharon Lynn Kagan, & Nancy Hall, eds. 
1996). 
7. Anne H. Geraghty & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Unified Family Courts: Tempering 
Enthusiasm with Caution, 40(4) FAM. CT. REV. 435, 437 (2002). 
8. CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 29 (1998), quot-
ed in Geraghty & Mlyniec, supra note 7, at 448. See also Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., supra note I 
and accompanying text. 
9. See Are Special Courts for Juvenile Offenders a Relic of the Past, or a Blueprint for the 
Future? 2, 7 (American Prosecutors Research Institute 1999). 
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mission of the juvenile courts was to rehabilitate delinquents and to make 
them productive citizens, and the process followed was more along the 
lines of information-gathering and problem-solving rather than centered 
around due process rights and attorney representation. 
The juvenile court eventually diverged sharply from the system's orig-
inal premise. In particular, the juvenile court system during much of the 
twentieth century served as a vehicle for imposing harsh and coercive 
sanctions against children and families and enabled what amounted to 
criminal trials without benefit of counsel, notice of specific charges, the 
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, or the right not to incrim-
inate oneself. 10 
In the 1960s and 1970s, several United States Supreme Court rulings 
radically changed the nature of juvenile courts. 11 A conservative reform 
movement emphasizing deterrence and punishment began in the late 1970s, 
continuing into the early 1980s. 12 Proponents demanded zealous prosecution 
of serious and violent juvenile offenders, and, accordingly, many states 
made it easier to transfer juveniles to adult courts, while other states stiff-
ened penalties and imposed mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines. 13 
Throughout the 1990s, state legislators seized on this trend toward 
cracking down on juvenile crime. Laws were passed and increasingly 
used to transfer children to criminal court on the theory that community 
protection would be enhanced by deterring juveniles from committing 
serious crimes and by providing greater certainty of incarceration through 
10. Sanford J. Fox, The Early History of the Court, in 3 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: THE 
JUVENILE COURT 29 (1996). 
11. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (a minor denied process rights when the 
trial judge fails to hold a hearing prior to transferring him to adult court for trial); In re Gault, 
387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that in hearings that could result in commitment to an institution, 
juveniles have the right of notice, right to counsel, right against self-incrimination, and the right 
to confront witnesses); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 
U.S. 528 (1971) (the due process clause of the 14th Amendment does not require jury trials in 
juvenile court); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (an adjudication in juvenile court, in which 
a juvenile is found to have violated a criminal statute, is equivalent to a criminal trial in crimi-
nal court); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (preventive detention serves a legitimate state 
objective in protecting both the juvenile and society from pretrial crime and is not intended to 
punish the juvenile); see also Janet Gilbert, et aI., Applying Therapeutic Principles to a Family-
Focused Juvenile Justice Model (Delinquency), 52 ALA. L. REV. 1153 (2001), for an excellent 
overview of the juvenile court as well as a discussion of therapeutic justice as it related to the 
juvenile court. 
12. Howard N. Snyder & Melissa Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National 
Report 83-86 (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention) 
available at http://ncjrs.org!htmVojjdp/nationalreport99/toc.html. 
13. Jeffrey A. Butts & Adele Harrell, Delinquents or Criminals?: Policy Options for Young 
Offenders, CRIME POL'y REP. 4-5 (Urban InstituteI998). 
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a criminal trial and sentencing. 14 While laws that allowed transfer of certain 
juveniles to criminal court were not new,15 state legislatures have increas-
ingly moved juvenile offenders into criminal court based on age and/or 
offense seriousness, without the individualized consideration of a more 
discretionary juvenile court. 16 
Even this most basic and brief look at the history of the juvenile court 
movement in the United States reveals the ebb and flow of guiding prin-
ciples: beginning with the harsh, punitive approach exemplified by the 
Cook County jail (where 1,705 children were incarcerated between 1897 
and 1899); progressing to the therapeutic model developed in response by 
Jane Addams and her colleagues at Hull House; culminating in the decades 
of reform expanding the formality and severity of the juvenile court, but 
also reducing the ability of juvenile courts to provide individualized and 
appropriate dispositions for young offenders. 
This article will examine the demographics of the current juvenile 
delinquency caseloads and will argue that, despite trends toward greater 
punitive measures-including placement of juveniles in adult courts for 
certain offenses, the concept of a therapeutic "family-centered court," 
which inspired Jane Addams and her colleagues, remains the most prom-
ising approach to delinquency, articulated most notably by the proponents 
of the unified family court concept. The article will consider and address 
objections and concerns raised with respect to this approach, looking at 
ways in which several states have incorporated juvenile delinquency into 
a family-centered unified family court. 
II. Caseloads and Demographics: 
Straining Resources, Programs, and Families 
Courts with juvenile jurisdiction handle some 1.8 million delinquency 
cases each year. 17 Nearly seven in ten arrested juveniles are referred to 
juvenile court. IS This does not mean that the judge sees all or even most 
of these cases, as about half of all cases referred to juvenile court intake 
are handled informally.19 
14. Richard E. Redding, The Effects of Adjudicating and Sentencing Juveniles as Adults, I 
YOUTH VIOL. & Juv. JUSTICE 128 (2003). 
15. Melissa Sickmund, Juveniles in Coun, NAT'L REP. SERIES BULL. 6 (U.S. Department of 
Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (June 2003). 
16. ld. at 7. 
17. ld. at 12. 
18. ld. at 2. 
19. ld. See also Howard N. Snyder, The Juvenile Court and Delinquency Cases, in 6(3) THE 
FUTURE OF CHILDREN: THE JUVENILE COURT 53-63 (1996). 
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Most infonnally processed cases are dismissed, or the juvenile volun-
tarily agrees to specific conditions for a specified time period. In the cases 
that are handled fonnally, intake files either a delinquency petition request-
ing an adjudicatory hearing or a petition requesting a waiver hearing to 
transfer the case to criminal court. In 1998, juvenile courts waived one 
percent of all fonnally processed delinquency cases.20 
However, beginning in the 1970s and continuing through the present 
state legislatures increasingly have moved juvenile offenders into criminal 
court based on age and/or offense seriousness, without the case-specific 
consideration offered by the discretionary juvenile court judicial waiver 
process. At the end of the 1999 legislative session, twenty-nine states have 
statutory exclusion provisions.21 The offenses most often excluded from 
juvenile court include murder, capital crimes, and other serious offenses 
against persons. 
It is particularly illustrative to look at the demographic infonnation 
relating to the types of cases handled by courts with juvenile jurisdiction 
in the United States.22 
• Delinquency case rates rose between 1989 and 1998 for most 
ages. In 1998, juvenile courts handled 60.4 delinquency cases 
for every 1,000 juveniles in the U.S. population. The 1998 delin-
quency case rate was 25% greater than the 1989 rate. For all but 
the youngest age groups, age-specific case rates showed similar 
increases, although the greatest increase was among seventeen 
year olds. 
• Most delinquency cases involved older teens. Juveniles age fif-
teen and older made up 64% of the delinquency caseload in 
1998. Juveniles age thirteen and fourteen years were involved in 
26% of delinquency cases, while juveniles age twelve and younger 
accounted for 10%. In 1998, the number of juvenile court cases 
involving seventeen year olds was lower than the number 
involving sixteen year olds--due primarily to the fact that, in 
thirteen states, seventeen year olds were excluded from the orig-
inal jurisdiction of the juvenile court and were legally adults, 
therefore referred to criminal court. 
• The most striking age-related increase in rates was in drug cases. 
Drug case rates were highest for seventeen year olds of both 
sexes. In 1998, the caseload of juveniles age twelve years and 
younger had larger proportions of person and property offenses 
20. Id. at 3. 
21. Id.at5. 
22. Id. at 12-24. 
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and smaller proportions of drug and public-order offenses, com-
pared with caseloads of older juveniles. 
Perhaps the most interesting and noteworthy aspect of the most recent 
demographic data was the fmding that those who began offending as young 
children were more likely to become violent offenders. Dr. Howard Snyder 
studied the juvenile court records of more than 150,000 urban juveniles 
who aged out of the juvenile justice system (i.e., turned age eighteen) 
between 1980 and 1995.23 The study found that the earlier a youth entered 
the juvenile justice system, the more likely he or she was to acquire an 
extensive juvenile court record.24 The younger the juvenile was at first 
referral to the court, the more likely he or she was to have at least four sep-
arate referrals to juvenile court intake, at least one referral for a serious 
offense, and at least one referral for a violent offense by the time he or she 
reached age eighteen.25 
Furthermore, the fiscal and social costs of this youth violence are unac-
ceptably high. Caring for an incarcerated juvenile for one year costs 
$40,000.26 Vandalism in schools costs more than $200 million a year, and 
vandalism directed at personal property is even higher. 27 Delinquent 
behavior also carries other kinds of costs that are difficult to quantify-
diminished quality of life for victims, reduced earning potential and life 
expectations for delinquent juveniles; and emotional stress on the families 
of these children and on their victims. 
Changes in the juvenile delinquency caseload in recent years have 
strained the courts' resources and programs. Between 1989 and 1998, the 
volume of cases handled by juvenile courts has increased across all four 
general offense categories. Person offense cases have risen 88%; property 
cases have risen 11 %; drug cases have risen 148%; and public order cases 
have risen 73%.28 
As juvenile crime has increased, the public has become frustrated, and 
politicians have expressed serious doubts about the future of the juvenile 
23. Howard N. Snyder, Epidemiology of Official Offending, in CHILD DELINQUENTS: 
DEVELOPMENT, INTERVENTION, AND SERVICE NEEDS (Rolf Loeber & David P. Farrington eds. 
2001) [hereinafter CHILD DELINQUENTS]. See also Howard N. Snyder, et a\., Prevalence and 
Development of Child Delinquency, CHILD DELINQUENCY BULLETIN (March 2003). 
24. Synder et a\., supra note 19. 
25. Id. 
26. W.S. Davison & R. Redner, The Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency: Diversionfrom the 
Juvenile Justice System, in FOURTEEN OUNCES OF PREVENTION: A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS 
123-137 (E.L. Cowen, R.P. Lorion, & J. Ramos-McKay eds. 1988). 
27. Edward Zigler, Early Intervention to Prevent Juvenile Delinquency, HARVARD MENTAL 
HEALTH LEITER 3, 5 (Sept. 1994). 
28. See Melissa Sickmund, supra note 15, at 13. 
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justice system.29 Nowhere has this been more pronounced than in the 
trend in many states toward sending juveniles to the adult court system,30 
and the public fmnly supports this approach.31 At the same time, resources 
for juvenile court programs are declining and juvenile court judges in 
many states have relatively few program options to handle delinquent 
youth. Probation caseloads are overwhelming,32 and the number of delin-
quency cases involving detention is rising.33 The juvenile justice court is, 
in short, a system on the brink of disaster-if not already over the edge. 
It is critical, then, to find remedies to the current state of affairs in the 
juvenile justice system. There are those who believe that the current juve-
nile court system needs to be fixed-that the court's basic role remains, 
and should remain, as a forum for resolving disputes, and that public 
monies should be allocated to address the problems that bring families and 
children into court in the flrst place.34 
III. Coordination 
The need to address the behavior of youth with a different set of laws 
and remedies than those applied in the adult courts has long been recog-
nized. When the flrst juvenile court was implemented in Chicago in 1902, 
29. In 1997, Senator Peter Domenici stated: "In many jurisdictions, [teenagers] commit as 
many as 10 to 15 serious crimes before anything is done to them. It is amazing how ancient, 
archaic, and broken down the juvenile justice system is." CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, S5897. In 
the same year, Senator Ron Wyden said for the record, "It is not hard to see why State legisla-
tures around the country are proposing bills to get rid of the juvenile justice system altogether." 
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, S2341(quoted by Jeffrey A. Butts & Adele V. Harrell, "Delinquents 
or Criminals? Policy Options for Young Offenders," supra note 13. 
30. All states allow juveniles to be tried as adults in criminal court under certain circum-
stances. Transfers can typically be done by judicial waiver (the juvenile court judge has the 
authority to waive juvenile court jurisdiction and move the case to criminal court); concurrent 
jurisdiction (original jurisdiction is shared by both criminal and juvenile courts; the prosecutor 
has discretion to file such cases in either court); or statutory exclusion from juvenile court. Until 
the 1970s, discretionary judicial waiver was the most common transfer mechanism. Throughout 
the 1990s, however, legislatures increasingly enacted statutes that exclude certain cases from 
juvenile court. At the end of the 1999 legislative session, 29 states had statutory exclusion pro-
visions. See Sickmund, supra note 15, at 5-10. 
31. According to an NBC News-Wall Street Journal poll, two-thirds of Americans think 
juveniles under age 13 who commit murder should be tried as adults. Laurie Asseo, Debate 
Rages on Juvenile Murders, Assoc. PREss, April 24, 1998. In a 2001 survey, a majority (65%) 
thought that juveniles aged 14-17 should be treated the same as adults in the criminal justice 
system. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS (Ann Pastore & Kathleen Maguire, eds. 
2001) available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/. 
32. Sickmund, supra note 15, at 23. 
33. [d. at 18. 
34. Geraghty & Mlyniec, supra note 7, at 436. 
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its founders believed that children develop and change based on envi-
ronmental influences and that the state must assume a degree of parental 
responsibility for children raised in an environment that negatively 
impacts on their development .... Creation of the Family Divisions pro-
vides the juvenile justice system with an opportunity to combine delin-
quency adjudication with a strong presence in the life of the juvenile's 
family. 
Families in court have interconnected emotional and financial prob-
lems that appear and re-appear in different courts at different times 
throughout the lives of that family's members. One report has found that 
approximately 40% of families come before the court more than once for 
family-related matters and generate a disproportionate share of the court's 
caseload.35 Another study has shown that at least 64% of abuse and neg-
lect cases, 48% of delinquency cases, and 16% of divorcing families who 
had children have been to court for another family-related matter during 
the prior five years.36 
The impact of repeated court appearances-very often in different court-
houses in different locations-includes substantial logistical and coordina-
tion difficulties, emotional trauma, and significant expense for both the 
courts and the children and families who are already in crisis. Numerous 
court appearances are required; judges have to become familiar with the 
families' backgrounds; and social service personnel from different courts 
duplicate services and inquiries.37 
While the increasing complexity and volume of cases involving fami-
lies and children that confront the court are undeniable, there is far from 
unanimity on questions regarding how the justice system should respond. 
Some argue that adjudication of the original dispute bringing a family into 
the court is actually "a minor part of the process" in a unified family COurt.38 
Instead, they state, "Many advocates of family courts see the court as a 
centralized place where services are coordinated, doled out, and monitored. 
Judges are supposed to take service providers to task when they are 
ineffective, ensure that duplicate services are not given by different agen-
cies, and watch family members to make sure that they are taking part in 
required treatment.,,39 
35. H. Ted Rubin & Victor Eugene Flango, Court Coordination of Family Cases 5 (National 
Center for State Courts, 1992). 
36. Id. at 30. 
37. Andrew Schepard, Law and Children: Introduction to Unified Family Courts, N.Y.L.J., 
Apr. 16,1997, at 3 (col.J). 
38. Geraghty & Mlyniec, supra note 7, at 442. 
39. /d. (referring to an article-Jeffrey A. Kuhn, A Seven-Year Lesson on Unified Family 
Courts: What We Have Learned Since the 1990 National Family Court Symposium, 32 FAM. 
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In certain respects, this is an accurate description. Effective processing 
of family law cases calls for coordination with social service agencies. 
Accordingly, courts are often placed in a position of monitoring and enforc-
ing treatment and other services for juveniles that have been recommended 
by human services professionals, law enforcement sanctions, and mandates 
imposed by federal and state legislation. The role of courts as "service 
coordinators" however is expanding. This expansion is not because courts 
are assuming responsibilities once held by child welfare or social service 
agencies, but, rather, because the need for coordination between courts and 
agencies, as well as among courts themselves, increasingly is recognized.4o 
While agencies continue to be responsible for providing needed services 
to children and families, courts-in the absence of any other organiza-
tion-must assume oversight responsibility to ensure that families receive 
these services. 
In Delaware, for example, the Department of Services to Children, 
Youth, and Families places social workers in the court building to coordi-
nate with the family court. When the family of a delinquent is determined 
to be involved in another family court case relating to another department, 
workers in the two divisions are asked to present or file a unified case plan.41 
But the unified family court model does not simply tum the family 
court into some sort of "uber-agency." While this model is based on a 
nonadversarial approach, it does not dispense with sanctions when it 
comes to addressing delinquency matters, nor does it relinquish the role 
of the court as an impartial arbiter. The sanctioning power of the courts 
can be used to ensure treatment. Juvenile delinquents may be ordered by 
the court, for instance, to attend counseling or therapy, pursue drug treat-
ment' perform community service, or attend residential treatment and/or 
training programs.42 
The unified family court is premised on a definition of "coordination" 
that is far more expansive-and responsive to the needs of families in 
court-than simply ensuring that case processing proceeds smoothly and 
efficiently. In order to resolve family problems, the unified family court 
considers all of the parties related to the family's legal proceedings, as 
L.Q. 67, 78-79 (1998), in which Kuhn states that the judicial function in a one-team-to-one-fam-
ily model includes "calendar coordination and case monitoring." Kuhn also states, however, 
that "Judges, as well, are assigned to individual teams to assist with calendar coordination and 
case monitoring." In other words, it is the family court team-of which the judge is indisputably 
an integral member-that is responsible for calendar coordination and case monitoring. 
40. Carol FJango, et aI., How Are Courts Coordinating Family Cases? 5 (National Center for 
State Courts 1999). 
41. Id.at64 
42. Id. at 58. 
390 Family Law Quarterly, Volume 37, Number 3, Fall 2003 
well as all of the agencies, institutions, or organizations that need to be 
consulted or brought into the case.43 
In addition, the unified family court reviews the delivery of social 
services to ensure that agreements between families and agencies are 
implemented; if they are not, the court has the authority to enforce such 
agreements, monitor them for compliance, and/or order agencies to deliver 
services. While some scholars view this role as conforming to the "neutral 
arbiter role" of the court,44 this is, in fact, a significant departure from the 
position of the court as the objective arbiter of disputes. Instead of simply 
adjudicating legal disputes, the court must now oversee services, assess-
ments, evaluations, counseling, outreach, probation, diversion, detention, 
and community services. This is not the modus operandi of a neutral and 
independent forum. It is a way of conducting business that renders the 
court inextricably linked to agencies-and the day-to-day actions of those 
agencies. The court is responsible to ensure that services are appropriate 
and productive. While the court is independent of the agencies, it acts in 
concert with them. 
Both of these functions-imposing sanctions to ensure that treatment 
and/or other services are both provided and followed-are undertaken by 
the Denver Juvenile Justice Integrated Treatment Network (DJJITN). This 
model of coordination of treatment and services for juvenile offenders lends 
itself to adoption by family courts. DJJITN' s goal centers around providing 
a culturally competent, comprehensive continuum of care to meet the needs 
of juveniles with substance abuse or addiction problems. Its integrated 
management information system demonstrates how various agencies and 
organizations can work together to share and transfer data, while the court 
retains primary responsibility for coordination and oversight.45 
Juvenile justice systems perform a preliminary substance use screen to 
identify the degree of alcohol or other drug use.46 Referrals of juveniles 
from each of those points in the juvenile justice system, and social serv-
ices, are sent to the Denver Juvenile Justice Integrated T ASC (Treatment 
Accountability for Safer Communities) program, located in the Denver 
Juvenile Court, which serves as the central point for referrals. Case man-
agers who are certified alcohol and drug abuse counselors, and co-locate 
staff from some participating agencies, conduct the differential assessments, 
develop the treatment plans, link juveniles with the Network services and 
43. [d. at 4. 
44. [d. at 58. 
45. [d. at 68-71. 
46. For this and other infonnation regarding DJJITN, see the Network's Web site available 
at http://www.diiitn.state.co.us. 
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conduct ongoing monitoring and follow-up. Services are provided based on 
the assessment to meet the specific needs of each juvenile and family. The 
Network does not seek to develop new resources, but builds on existing 
efforts and infrastructure to build capacity and capability. 
The Network has entered into Memoranda of Understanding with more 
than 100 systems and agencies who have agreed to use, and/or accept the 
results of common screening and assessment instruments. These systems 
and agencies have agreed to refer or accept referrals of, and provide serv-
ices to Network juveniles, share information using Network protocols, and 
participate in the Network's integrated MIS system, cross-training, and 
outcome evaluation. 
IV. Privacy 
There is great reliance on information-sharing generally in a unified 
family court-between agencies; between courts; between the judge, 
attorney, caseworkers, social workers, CASAs, GALS, and other court 
staff or volunteers involved in the case. Domestic violence advocates in 
particular are concerned, however, that expectations of confidentiality are 
seriously threatened by a system in which judges have access to all prior 
court records and agency reports47-"[A] unified family court which 
decides to permit judges access to all prior court records pertaining to 
present litigants must anticipate certain risks and take steps to protect 
against them. ,,48 
There is an inherent tension between expectations of privacy and the 
mandates of the therapeutic perspective that drives unified family courts. 
The question often becomes one variation or another of "Where do we 
draw the line?" 
Juveniles, of course, have a legitimate interest in confidentiality. On the 
other hand, there is a strong emphasis on "family ecology"49 in a unified 
family court: "Courts must view neighborhoods, religious organizations, 
and other associations or institutions within which family members par-
ticipate as having the potential to influence the family's legal matters." If 
a juvenile has, for example, entered into a drug treatment program that 
47. See Billie Lee Dunford-Jackson et aI, Unified Family Courts: How Will They Serve 
Victims of Domestic Violence? 32 FAM. L. Q. 131, 140-41 (1998); Mark Hardin, Child 
Protection Cases in a Unified Family Court, 32 FAM. L.Q. 147, 161; (1998) Garaghty & 
M1yniec, supra note 7, at 439. 
48. Dunford-Jackson et ai., supra note 23, at 140. 
49. MARy ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY 
IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 308 (1989), quoted in Barbara A. Babb, 
Fashioning an Interdisciplinary Framework for Court Reform in Family Law: A Blueprint to 
Construct a Unified Family Court, 71 So. CAL. L. REV. 469, 508 (1998). 
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includes regular attendance at Alcoholic Anonymous meetings, does he/she 
have a right to confidentiality regarding treatment records and his/her atten-
dance at the meetings? While federal laws may protect the confidentiality 
of treatment records,50 should the court's interest in social institutions that 
"function as positive influences on family life,"51 trump the statutory and 
customary privacy inherent in drug treatment? Is information-sharing such 
an integral component of a court's effectiveness in addressing the prob-
lems of juveniles that limitations serve as impediments to real solutions? 
At least one prominent juvenile court judge believes that these questions 
should be answered with a strong affirmative. Judge James Payne of the 
Marion (Indiana) Superior Court's Juvenile Division and Vice-President/ 
Treasurer of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Courts (2002-
2003) testified before the United States House Subcommittee of the 
Judiciary in 2001: 
Again, in this age of infonnation technology, the inability, or in some cases, 
unwillingness, to share infonnation is a tremendous impediment. Federal laws 
and regulations at this time, in many cases, prohibit the free exchange of infonna-
tion. There is a need to evaluate infonnation sharing restrictions and to overcome 
those, not by developing means to overcome them, but in fact by amending, 
rescinding them or overriding them. It is not enough to find ways to work around 
current federal law restricting inability to share infonnation with schools and 
mental health. Laws of confidentiality for schools (FERP A), substance abuse 
(42 U.S.c. 290dd-2- 42 C.F.R. 2:1 et. seq.) and mental health rules should be 
evaluated and rewritten so the concept of infonnation sharing among system 
people is not only pennitted, but required.52 
While this view may be somewhat extreme, there are, in fact, statutory 
and court safeguards that protect the confidentiality of juvenile records-
and, increasingly, it is legislatures, not courts, that are expanding the 
50. Federal laws and regulations protect information about all persons receiving alcohol and 
drug abuse prevention and treatment services (42 U.S.c. § § 290dd-3, ee-3 ; 42 Code of Fed. 
Reg., Part 2). These laws and regulations prohibit disclosure of information regarding patients 
who have applied for or received any alcohol or drug abuse-related services, including assessment, 
diagnosis, counseling, group counseling, treatment, or referral for treatment, from a covered 
program. The restrictions on disclosure apply to any information that would identify a patient as 
an alcohol or drug abuser, either directly or by implication. They apply to patients who undertake 
treatment as a form of alternative processing, patients who are civilly or involuntarily committed, 
minor patients, and former patients. They apply even if the person making the inquiry already 
has the information, has other ways of getting it, enjoys official status, is authorized by state 
law, or comes armed with a subpoena or search warrant. 
5!. Babb supra note 49. 
52. Testimony of The Honorable James W. Payne, Judge, Marion Superior Court, Juvenile 
Division, Indianapolis, Indiana, before the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, United States House of Representatives, 107th Congo First Session on H.R. 863 
(March 8, 2001), see http://www.house.gov/judiciary;and/payne.030801.htm. 
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boundaries of pennissible cooperation and disclosure between agencies. 
When recent amendments to Illinois law expanded mandated reporting 
requirements of juvenile delinquency to local agencies, it noted: 
The General Assembly finds that a substantial and disproportionate amount of 
serious crime is committed by a relatively small number of juvenile offenders, 
otherwise known as serious habitual offenders. By this amendatory Act ... the 
General Assembly intends to support the efforts of the juvenile justice system 
comprised of law enforcement, state's attorneys, probation departments, juve-
nile courts, social service providers, and schools in the early identification and 
treatment of habitual juvenile offenders. The General Assembly further sup-
ports increased interagency efforts to gather comprehensive data and actively 
disseminate the data to the agencies in the juvenile justice system to produce 
more informed decisions by all entities in that system .... A cooperative and 
coordinated multidisciplinary approach will increase the opportunity for suc-
cess with juvenile offenders and assist in the development of early intervention 
strategies. 53 
This aspect of the unified family court model-greater interagency col-
laboration and infonnation-sharing-is part of a larger trend in this coun-
try: the attempt to detennine a juvenile's situation-including his/her 
past, relationships with caregivers, and school perfonnance, among other 
factors-which in tum depends on access to records, files, and documents 
that provide significant infonnation about that juvenile's background and 
personal history. 
At the same time, courts need to establish and maintain a careful balance 
between the need for interagency collaboration and the individual's interest 
in confidentiality.54 As has been pointed out in the context of domestic 
violence, "fundamental principles of due process and expectations of 
confidentiality have as certain a place in unified family courts as in any 
53. Ill. Juv. Court Act; 405 ILCS 405/1-8.1 (1999). A similar statement also appears in the 
recent expansion of California law regarding interagency record sharing with schools: 
While the Legislature reaffirms its belief that juvenile criminal records, in general, 
should be confidential, it is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this section to 
provide for a limited exception to that confidentiality in cases involving serious acts 
of violence. Further, it is the intent of the Legislature that even in these selected cases 
the dissemination of juvenile criminal records be as limited as possible, consistent 
with the need to work with a student in an appropriate fashion, and the need to pro-
tect potentially vulnerable school staff and other students over whom the school staff 
exercises direct supervision and responsibility. 
Cal. WeI. & Inst. Code. § 828.1 (1999). 
54. For an example of programs and guidelines that establish such a balance, as well as a 
firsthand account of the importance of interagency information sharing, see Hon. Gordon A. 
Martin, Jr., Open the Doors: A Judicial Call to End Confidentiality in Delinquency 
Proceedings, 21 N.E. J. on CRIM. & CIv. CON. 393-410 (1995); F1ango et aI., supra note 17, at 
68-70 (describing the Denver Juvenile Justice Integrated Treatment Network, which is a 
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other part of the judicial system.,,55 Many of the considerations raised by 
domestic violence advocates in discussions of confidentiality are applicable 
in delinquency cases as well. For instance, a judge may have access to a 
juvenile's record of treatment for mental illness but no information about 
the validity of the provider, the credibility of the underlying claim of mental 
illness, or follow-up care. The greater volume of information available 
regarding a delinquent in a unified family court places a significant burden 
on the court to ensure that this information is complete, accurate, and relevant. 
Moreover, the court has an additional responsibility flowing from the 
court's greatly expanded access to juvenile records and information about 
past behavior-the fundamental right to due process. 
V. The Role of the Judge and Due Process 
Perhaps the most frequently cited characterization of the unified family 
court concept is, "one family-one judge." The rationale behind this precept 
is that a judge who is acquainted with the legal problems of each family 
member is also acquainted with that family's dynamics, history, and place 
in the community. Armed with this knowledge, the judge can make more 
informed, consistent, and effective decisions than a judge who hears only 
one specific problem affecting that family. 
The therapeutic model on which the unified family court is based calls 
for an integrated approach to family legal issues. In the case of delinquency, 
this means that a judge must consider all of the parties related to that pro-
ceeding, as well as all of the institutions or organizations affecting the 
behavior of that child, including schools, peer groups, religious organiza-
tions, and clubs, to name a few. 56 Moreover, judges oversee services that 
are important adjuncts to the court's approach to delinquency: assessment 
and evaluation, counseling, availability of volunteers, community outreach, 
mental health services, family support services, restitution, probation, 
diversion, and detention services.57 
comprehensive information systems plan to improve the sharing and transferring of data among 
the various agencies that provide treatment and services for juvenile offenders with substance 
abuse problems. The system, located in the juvenile court, crosses agency computer systems and 
databases to track the status and progress of juvenile offenders. The program screens, assesses, 
and evaluates juvenile offenders in order to match treatment needs with the most appropriate 
treatment provider). 
55. Assessing the Needfor a Family Coun System in Colorado: Repon to the Legislature, 
Dec. 23, 1995, at 5, quoted in Dunford-Jackson et aI., supra note 47, at 140 (discussing the 
rights in the context of domestic violence proceedings in a unified family court). 
56. Robert W. Page, Family Couns: A Model for an Effective Judicial Approach to the 
Resolution of Family Disputes, ABA Summit on Unified Family Courts: Exploring Solutions for 
Families, Women and Children in Crisis, 16-17 (ABA 1998). 
57. See Sanford N. Katz & Jeffrey A. Kuhn, Recommendations for a Model Family Court 
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Geraghty and Mlyniec point out that the consequences of the unified 
family court's broad and expansive access to information about a juvenile's 
past may move the justice system dangerously close to a breach of due 
process.58 They point out that our legal system "prevent[s] juries from 
knowing a person's previous social history to ensure that the jury will not be 
swayed by that information.,"59 and though "the law assumes that judges 
can separate admissible from inadmissible information, there is little to 
guarantee this premise."60 
This description of the role of the family court is the flip side of the 
emphasis on services. While a central tenet of the unified family court is 
indeed the provision of services to families who need them, that is not to 
be confused with the role of the judge. It is the judge's responsibility to use 
the court's authority and power to enforce agreements between parents, 
children, and social service agencies, monitor court-ordered services, and 
under certain circumstances to order agencies to deliver services-but the 
judge maintains impartiality throughout this process. The judge does not 
alone decide which treatment, when necessary, is most appropriate; but 
he/she can use the court's sanctioning power to order a juvenile delin-
quent to attend counseling or therapy, perform community service, or 
attend residential treatment or training programs.61 Furthermore, ajudge's 
access to the expertise of social and mental health service providers pro-
vides him/her with the ability to construct the most effective resolutions 
to a family's problems in the context of available services and assistance. 
Geraghty and Mlyniec' s concerns do highlight a struggle between the 
traditional concept of the judge as a neutral arbiter of disputes on the one 
hand, and the therapeutic perspective that informs the judge's role in a 
unified family court.62 While there are certain cases in which there is a 
clear advantage to one judge or one team hearing related cases-for 
example, closely related custody, visitation, and child support matters63-
there are others where the boundaries of "relatedness" are not as clear, 
where judicial overfamiliarity with a family may make it nearly impossible 
to avoid bias. 
11 (1991); Babb, supra note 49, at 523; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION POLICY ON UNIFIED 
FAMILY COURTS, Reports with Recommendation to the House of Delegates, 1994 Annual 
Meeting, Section tOc (1994) (listing suggested appropriate services). 
58. Geraghty & Mlyniec, supra note 7, at 439; F1ango et aI., supra note 40, at 25. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 58. See also Babb, supra note 49, at 522-24 (discussing the provision of services 
in a unified family court). 
62. Babb, supra note 49, at 509-13. 
63. F1ango et aI., supra note 40, at 23. 
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Responses have ranged from voluntary recusal by the judge64 to pointing 
out that judges are under a general obligation to avoid bias in all cases65 
to an insistence that therapeutic considerations are not superior to other, 
more traditional, considerations-such as due process-that guide the 
court's deliberations.66 In Freehold, New Jersey, the Family Court Division 
separates all information from the court record about prior family cases 
until a youth has been adjudicated delinquent, providing that information 
only at disposition.67 
The bottom line, however, is that the unified family court and its 
emphasis on therapeutic jurisprudence does call for re-shaping the nature 
of judicial decision-making: "The goal of therapeutic jurisprudence sug-
gests a need to restructure the law and the legal process by applying 
behavioral science knowledge to accomplish therapeutic outcomes with-
out interfering with traditional notions of justice."68 While there are those 
who consider this a weakness, it is, in fact, this mandate to integrate a 
juvenile's behavior, environment, history-and family-into a service-
oriented, therapeutic remedy that is the unified family court's greatest 
strength in addressing delinquency matters. Rather than addressing juve-
nile delinquency from the perspective of a "scaled-down, second-class 
criminal court,,,69 the unified family court approach gives the judge the 
authority to fashion an effective solution to that juvenile's problems by 
managing and directing agencies in their delivery of services to children 
and families. 
In short, a basic premise of the unified family court is to provide "a 
social services delivery system" for families in crisis. It establishes a critical 
link between families and the kinds of programs that keep children out of 
trouble. These programs include links to social services as well as the lib-
eral use of nonadversarial methods of family dispute resolution. While 
these methods are used in nearly all unified family court cases, juvenile 
64. Id. at 25. See also, Brenda K. Uekert, Ann Keith, & Ted Rubin, Integrating Criminal and 
Civil Matters in Family Courts: Performance Areas and Recommendations 16 (National Center 
for State Courts 2002). 
65. Flango et aI., supra note 40, at 23. 
66. David Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Patients, Professionals, and the Path of Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence: A Response to Petrila, in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN 
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 707,714 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1997). 
67. Flango et aI., supra note 40, at 25. 
68. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Criminal Couns, 35 WILLIAM & 
MARY LAW REV. 279, 280 (1993) as cited in Barbara Babb, An Interdisciplinary Approach to 
Family Law Jurisprudence: Application of an Ecological and Therapeutic Perspective, 72 IND. 
LI. 775, 799 (1997). 
69. Barry C. Feld, Juvenile (In)justice and the Criminal Court Alternative, 39 CRIME & 
DELINQUENCY 403 (1993). 
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delinquency cases have provided the greatest number of nonadversarial 
techniques in diversionary programs.70 For example, New Jersey, which 
has a statewide unified family court system, has established widespread 
juvenile conference or neighborhood dispute committees, which serve as 
an arms of the court in hearing and deciding matters involving juvenile 
offenders." Other programs include youth juries or peer group committees, 
which resolve delinquency complaints out of court. 
The traditional juvenile court is no longer able to provide the individual-
ized attention envisioned by its founders and can no longer easily intervene 
when youths are at the earliest stages of offending, at a time when interven-
tions can be most effective in preventing future criminality. The unified 
family court, on the other hand, places a high premium on early intervention. 
VI. Early Intervention 
The prevention of violent criminal acts and other crimes perpetrated by 
youths has become a pressing issue in the national agenda, especially in light 
of the staggering economic and social costs of these offenses.71 Recently, 
prevention studies and clinical trials have supported the contention that 
effective interventions must address the multiple causes of criminal and 
violent behavior72 and that delinquency can be prevented by early child-
hood interventions programs that promote children's competence across 
multiple systems, including individual, family, classroom, school, and 
community factors. 
In other words, by intervening early in a young person's development, 
preschool programs and parent educational services that, for example, 
improve school readiness help set a pattern that prevents delinquency in 
later years. Children who participate receive better early school experi-
ences, and are less likely to drop out and become delinquents.73 The most 
70. Robert Page, Family Courts: An Effective Approach to the Resolution of Family Disputes, 
44 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 1,33-35 (1993). 
71. See The State of America's Children: A Reportfrom the Children's Defense Fund (March 
1998). 
72. See Edward Zigler, Cara Taussic & Kathryn Black, Early Childhood Intervention: A 
Promising Preventative for Juvenile Delinquency, 47 AMER. PSYCHOL. 997-1006 (1992); Dan 
Olweus, Bullying Among School Children: Intervention and Prevention in AGGRESSION AND 
VIOLENCE THROUGHOUT THE LIFE SPAN 100-25 (Ray Dev. Peters et aI, eds.1992) (demonstrating 
that a large-scale secondary prevention program produced significant reductions in bullying); 
Charles M. Borduin et aI, Multisystemic Treatment of Serious Juvenile Offenders: Long-Term 
Prevention of Criminality and Violence, 63 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 4, 569-78 
(examining the long-term effects of multisystemic therapy on the prevention of criminal behavior 
and violent offending among juvenile offenders at high risk for committing additional violent 
offenses). 
73. Zigler, supra note 27, at 2. 
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effective early intervention programs capitalize on the family support 
structure: they provide services such as health care, parent support and edu-
cation, and facilitate connections between the parents and community 
resources.74 Based on an ecological perspective, these programs center 
around the family as the most important influence in a child's life, which 
in tum is influenced by community institutions such as the workplace, 
schools, and services.75 
It is imperative that intervention is made as early as possible in a child's 
life if a goal is to prevent recidivism. Each subsequent time a juvenile is 
referred to court, the odds that the court can successfully intervene 
decline.76 Recognizing the importance of early intervention, The National 
Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges has made a programmatic 
recommendation that "priority should be given to providing sanctions and 
services for potentially or already serious, violent, and chronic juvenile 
offenders as early as possible in the offender's delinquent career.'>77 
That recommendation is supported by the conclusions of numerous 
researchers and experts. For example, the U.S. Department of Justice 
assembled an Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Study 
74. /d. 
75. Zigler describes several such programs. The Seattle Social Development Program, which 
began in the early 1980s, provides services that address the ecological risk factors for delinquency. 
Preliminary findings suggest that delinquent behavior in the fifth grade is reduced among children 
who participate at any time between the first and fourth grades. The Syracuse University Family 
Development Research Program provides supplemental child care and works to improve children's 
lives by changing their home environment. Most participants were families in which the mother 
was a young, single, high-school dropout, with a poor employment history. Service providers 
met with the families weekly and provided information on nutrition and child development, as 
well as guidance in establishing positive parent-child relationships. At ages ranging from 13 to 
16, only 6% of the program's graduates had been involved in the juvenile justice system, as 
compared with 22% of controls from similar families. The program's average saving to the 
juvenile justice system was approximately $1800 per child. See Zigler, id. at 3-4. See also I.M. 
Montgomery et ai, What Works: Promising Interventions in Juvenile Justice (U.S. Department 
of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1994); M.W. Lipsey & D. B. 
Wilson, Effective Interventions with Serious Juvenile Offenders: A Synthesis of Research, in 
SERIOUS AND VIOLENT OFFENDERS: RISK FACfORS AND SUCCESSFUL INTERVENTIONS 313-345 (R. 
Loeber & D.P. Farrington eds. 1998). 
76. See P.E. TRACY & K. KEMPF-LEONARD, CONTINUITY AND DISCONTINUITY IN CRIMINAL 
CAREERS (1996); Howard Snyder, Serious, Violent and Chronic Juvenile Offenders: An 
Assessment of the Extent of and Trends I Officially-Recognized Serious Criminal Behavior in a 
Delinquent Population, in SERIOUS AND VIOLENT OFFENDERS, supra note 75, at 428-444. 
77. Recommendation from a National Symposium sponsored by the Council of Juvenile and 
Family Court Judges, The Janiculum Project: Reviewing the Past and Looking Toward the 
Future of the Juvenile Court (1998). 
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Group on Very Young Offenders in 1998. In a report released in 2001,78 
the Study Group concludes that "of all known interventions to reduce 
juvenile delinquency, preventive interventions that focus on child delin-
quency will probably take the largest "bite" out of crime .... "The earlier 
the better" is a key then in establishing interventions to prevent child 
delinquency ... "79 An opinion survey of practitioners conducted by the 
Study Group found that nearly three-quarters (71 %) thought that effective 
methods were available to deal with child delinquents to reduce the risk 
of future offending.8o 
While there is considerable evidence supporting the notion of early 
intervention as a most effective means of preventing later juvenile crime, 
there are equally substantial legal concerns surrounding this approach. 
Geraghty and Mlyniec raise two important objections: (1) therapeutic 
early intervention is a coercive sanction dressed up as benign considera-
tions 81 and (2) this approach holds the resolution of social problems to be 
of paramount importance, while resolution of the dispute that originally 
brings a family into court is secondary.82 
On the first point-that early intervention is coercion in disguise-
there is little evidence that families exposed to this approach actually do 
view it as antithetical to their own beliefs and/or imposing coercion on 
their actions. In an evaluation of Maryland's high-conflict custody program, 
which offers ancillary services as part of the state's unified family court 
approach, respondents to a survey overwhelmingly welcomed the support 
services and programs available to them.83 Moreover, there are numerous 
court programs based on a therapeutic approach--drug court programs, 
juvenile drug courts, community courts, to name a few-that are based on 
a therapeutic approach (and, in the case of drug courts, a far more coercive 
one) which have been welcomed by participants despite their coercive 
nature.84 While there is undeniably a coercive element in the unified family 
78. CHILD DELINQUENTS, supra note 23. 
79. Rolf Loeber, David P. Farrington, & David Petechuk, Child Delinquency: Early 
Intervention and Prevention, CHILD DELINQUENCY BULL. 9 (May 2003). 
80. Id. 
8l. Geraghty & Mlyniec, supra note 7, at 44l. Authors assert that therapeutic remedies are 
"inherently suspect because they do not start with the world-view of those who must comply 
with them. Instead they take on the perspective of the social science researcher who has struc-
tured his research and collected data in the context of his own perceptions and biases." 
82. [d. at 442. Geraghty & Mlyniec argue that under a unified family court system, "adjudi-
cation of the original dispute seems to be a minor part of the process." 
83. Report prepared for the Maryland Legal Services Corporation, Center for Families, 
Children and the Courts, Evaluation of the High Conflict Custody Program (2003). 
84. See Steven Belenko, Research on Drug Courts: A Critical Review, 2 NAT'L DRUG CT. 
lNST. REV. 1,23-4 (1999). 
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court-an element, by the way, that is far from absent in many current 
juvenile courts85-there is scant evidence that the recipients of and partici-
pants in the services and programs available through the court's intervention 
resent these "interventions." 
If there is one defining characteristic of juvenile courts in the past 100 
years, it is that they have developed in unique styles. The early juvenile 
courts were built on a philosophy of helping young offenders rather than 
establishing their guilt; in later years, these courts were guided primarily 
by due process protections. That, in many ways, has been the undoing of 
the juvenile court-the emphasis on dispute resolution with its network of 
safeguards, due process protections, and sentencing guidelines-has 
deprived judges of the discretion and individualized approaches that 
should characterize an arena deciding cases ranging from II-year old 
shoplifters to I8-year old murderers. The unified family court, far more 
than the majority of current juvenile courts, allows judges the flexibility 
to choose different responses to the vast array of offenders coming before 
them as "juvenile delinquents." 
VII. Conclusion 
Frustrated by increasing youth crime rates and violence, the public is 
demanding more effective methods of dealing with juvenile delinquency, 
and lawmakers often translate those demands into policies that emphasize 
punishment and incarceration and increasing the formality of juvenile court 
procedures, including transfers to adult court and implementing sentencing 
guidelines.86 
The juvenile court was created as a mean to address juvenile crime in 
a way that allowed the court more flexibility and initiative than traditional 
criminal court. As judicial discretion and creativity is diminished by harsher 
policies, the justice system becomes unable to provide the individualized 
attention envisioned by its founders, and judges today are stymied when 
attempting to intervene in the lives of children who are still only at risk of 
85. There are states whose statutory provisions allow the courts to punish and/or hold par-
ents in contempt where it can be demonstrated that the parents, either by actions of omission or 
commission, contributed to the child's delinquency problems. See Gilbert et aI., supra note II 
at 1152 citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-234(c); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-330(a)(l0); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 985.231(1)(a)(5), (7), (9); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-28(C); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 37-1-174(b) Gilbert provides additional examples of statutory authority enabling juvenile 
court judges to use coercive sanctions, including in some cases criminal liability and potential 
for incarceration against parents of delinquents. 
86. See Richard E. Redding, The Effects of Adjudicating and Sentencing Juveniles as Adults: 
Research and Policy Implications, 1 YOUTH VIOLENCE & Juv. JUSTICE 128-55 (April 2003); 
Butts & Harrell, supra note 13, at 14. 
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future offending. The unified family court and its underlying notion of 
therapeutic jurisprudence present one-and perhaps our best-hope of 
allowing the justice system to aggressively and creatively handle young 
offenders while preserving the rights of offenders and maintaining public 
safety. 
